Home of Rabbi Burglarized on Friday Night

The home of a Jewish family in Crown Heights was burglarized over Shabbos, the thief made off with electronics and silverware.

The burglary occurred on Shabbos, sometime between Friday night and Saturday morning, at the home of R. Yosef Braun on Carroll Street near New York Avenue.

Burglars reportedly made off with an iPhone, an iPad, silver coins as well as silverware.

A police report was filed at the conclusion of Shabbos.

The following day, the victims noticed that the phone had come online and were able to track it to a nearby park using the “find my iPhone” app. Police were quickly called and two suspects were apprehended.

“We have two people in custody that had in their possession the electronics and some coins, but none of the silverware,” said a police source, describing the two as men in their 50s, one of whom has an extensive criminal history for minor drug violations.

Police also found a small amount of crack in their possession.

The suspects were charged with possession of stolen property and narcotics, but have not been charged with the burglary. “We have no evidence linking them to the burglary and surveillance video of the incident is poor at best,” police said.

Police still hope to determine if these suspects are in fact the burglars, using the aid of forensics.

9 Comments

  • Use "Enhanced Interrogation"

    If these guys had the silver coins in their possession, there’s no way they are not the burglars.

    While that is circumstantial evidence, time is of the essence. Need to use good interrogation techniques to find out what they did with the silverware, where they sold it, etc. etc.

    Unfortunately NYPD is UNINTERESTED in solving these crimes. I am talking from first hand experience, as a victim!

    • Toshov hashchuna

      Doctrine of Recent Possession:

      this doctrine permits an inference of guilt based on a defendant’s possession of stolen property recently after a larceny or breaking and entering. State v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669 (1981); State v. Gonzalez, 311 N.C. 80 (1984); State v. Ethridge, 168 N.C. App. 359 (2005); State v. McQueen, 165 N.C. App. 454 (2004); State v. Mitchell, 109 N.C. App. 222 (1993). In order for the inference to apply, the evidence must show that:

      (1) the property was stolen,

      (2) the stolen goods were found in the defendant’s custody and subject to his or her control and disposition to the exclusion of others, and

      (3) the defendant had possession of the property recently after it was stolen.

      Maines, 301 N.C. 669; Gonzalez, 311 N.C. 80; Ethridge, 168 N.C. App. 359; McQueen, 165 N.C. App. 454; State v. Earwood, 155 N.C. App. 698 (2003).

      The first prong of the test requires that the property be identified as stolen. State v. Carter, 122 N.C. App. 332 (1996). In one case, the doctrine was held not to apply when the owner could not positively identify the goods (tires) as the stolen items because they were mass produced and had no individual identifying characteristics. State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480 (1966).

      The second prong requires that the stolen property is found in the defendant’s custody and possession or subject to his or her control and disposition. State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516 (1985); State v. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41 (1986). Proof of either actual or constructive possession will suffice. Maines, 301 N.C. 669; Wilson, 313 N.C. 516; State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235 (2002). Actual possession could be, for example, the defendant having the items on his or her person. State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 379 (2002) (goods were in a briefcase carried by defendant). Constructive possession could be, for example, the defendant keeping the items in a locked facility. Foster, 268 N.C. 480; Maines, 301 N.C. 669. Joint possession can satisfy this prong of the doctrine. Maines, 301 N.C. 669. For the inference of guilt to arise in a case of joint possession, the possession must be to the exclusion of all persons not party to the crime. Id.; State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235 (2002); State v. Foster, 149 N.C. App. 206 (2002); State v. Sluka, 107 N.C. App. 200 (1992). Thus, the defendant possessed stolen property when the stolen items were found in a truck driven by the defendant and the two other passengers in the truck were parties to the crime. Foster, 149 N.C. App. 206 (2002). By contrast, the evidence was insufficient when the defendant was found, along with three other individuals, in a car containing stolen goods but no criminal conspiracy was shown among the four. Maines, 301 N.C. 669.

      The third prong of the doctrine requires that the defendant had possession of the property recently after it was stolen. There are no firm rules about how soon the defendant must come into possession of the property. State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516 (1985); State v. Patterson, 194 N.C. App. 608, 619 (2009) (“no bright line rule”). The general rule, however, is that the time between the theft and the possession must be close enough to make it unlikely that the possessor could have acquired the property honestly. State v. Jackson, 274 N.C. 594 (1968); State v. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41 (1986); State v. Friend, 164 N.C. App. 430 (2004). Thus, for example, evidence supported application of the doctrine when (1) a video camera was found in the defendant’s possession 21 days after a break-in, Patterson, 194 N.C. App. at 620–21; (2) the contents of a robbery victim’s purse were found in the defendant’s possession within 24 hours after the robbery, State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 379 (2002); (3) within several days of a number of larcenies from nearby houses, stolen articles were found in the defendants’ home, State v. Eppley, 282 N.C. 249 (1972); and (4) the victim’s stolen address book was seen in the defendant’s car three days after the larceny, State v. Pickard, 143 N.C. App. 485 (2001).

      If the stolen property is a type normally and commonly traded in lawful channels, a relatively brief time interval between the theft and the finding of an accused in possession is required. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41; State v. McQueen, 165 N.C. App. 454 (2004). Thus, the doctrine was inapplicable when a defendant was found in possession of eight-track tapes 19 days after they were stolen and a rifle 30 days after it was stolen and the State conceded that both items are frequently traded in normal channels. State v. Parker, 54 N.C. App. 522 (1981); see also Hamlet, 316 N.C. at 45–46 (possession after 30 days was insufficient to invoke doctrine given that the items were normally and frequently traded in lawful channels). When the item is not normally or commonly traded in lawful channels, the doctrine may apply after the passage of a longer period of time between the larceny and the defendant’s possession. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41; McQueen, 165 N.C. App. 454. For example, the doctrine applied when (1) the defendant possessed a unique tool not generally traded in his community 27 days after it was stolen and fingerprint evidence tied the defendant to the theft, State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C. App. 66 (1969); (2) the defendant or his girlfriend possessed a stolen watch up to four weeks after it was stolen, State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 536–37 (1985); and (3) the defendant possessed commercial restaurant equipment 11─12 days after it had been stolen, State v. Callahan, 83 N.C. App. 323 (1986).

  • Miriam Levy

    This is very disturbing to me, to know the police are not interested in these crimes. The thugs also know this and will continue to burglarize peoples homes and get off easy !!!

  • Grateful we left

    I saw 2 black men break my daughters car window in broad daylight. They made off with a purse. On Yom Kippur. I flagged down police and told them crooks went up the street and they could catch / them. Care less and told me to all after holiday. That’s Crown Heights